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Abstract 
Academic rankings today are the backbone of research governance, which seem to fit the 
aims of “new public management” on the one side and the idea of the “republic of science” on 
the other side. Nevertheless rankings recently came under scrutiny. We discuss advantages 
and disadvantages of academic rankings, in particular their unintended negative consequences 
on the research process. To counterbalance these negative consequences we suggest (a) 
rigorous selection and socialization, and (b) downplaying the impact of rankings in order to 
reconcile academic self-governance with accountability to the public. 
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Introduction 
Academic rankings today are generally considered the backbone of research governance in 
academia. On the one hand they are based on the evaluation of scientific peers who are the 
only ones able to estimate the quality of research. On the other hand rankings are considered 
to give the public a transparent picture of scholarly activity and to make universities more 
accountable for their use of public money. They are intended to unlock the “secrets of the 
world of research” (Weingart 2005, p. 119) for journalists as well as for deans, administrators, 
and politicians who have no special knowledge of the field. They provide a basis for control, 
for the allocation of resources and for the provision of compensation packages (e.g. Worrell 
2009). However, in recent times peer reviews and academic rankings have come under 
scrutiny. A lively discussion about the quality of peer reviews (e.g. Lawrence 2002, 2003; 
Frey 2003; Starbuck 2005, 2006; Abramo, Angelo, and Caprasecca 2009) and academic 
rankings (e.g. Adler and Harzing 2009; Albers 2009) takes place. This discussion focuses 
mainly on issues of method and how to improve it. It is taken for granted that more and better 
indicators are needed to enhance the quality of rankings (e.g. Starbuck 2009). Only in a few 
cases it is asked whether the advantage of controlling research activities from outside may 
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produce unintended negative side effects, even if indicators for research quality were perfect 
(e.g. Weingart 2005; Espeland and Sauder 2007). As a consequence, the question has not been 
raised whether there are viable alternatives to academic rankings as an instrument for 
academic governance.  
In this article, we discuss two issues. First, we analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of rankings, in particular their unintended negative consequences. Second we 
ask whether there exists an alternative to academic rankings as the main instrument of 
academic governance.  
 We begin by analyzing two conceptual pillars of rankings as the basis of our present 
research governance, namely on the one side “new public management” and on the other side 
the concept of the “republic of science”. The second section presents empirically based 
findings on the advantages and disadvantages of rankings and suggestions made on how to 
overcome their shortcomings. The third section focuses on an aspect mostly disregarded, 
namely the behavioral reactions to rankings which may overcompensate their advantages. The 
last section discusses whether and to which extent there are viable alternatives to rankings as 
the dominant instruments of research governance. 
Conceptual Issues: “New Public Management” versus “Republic of Science”? 
Over the past years, universities have increasingly adopted the idea of “new public 
management”, namely the idea that universities, like other public services such as hospitals, 
schools or public transport should be subjected to a similar governance as for-profit 
enterprises. “More market” and “strong leadership” have become the keywords (Schimank 
2005). This is reflected in procedures transferred from private companies like management by 
objectives or pay-for-performance for scholars. Overall, the reforms are aimed at the 
establishment of an “enterprise university” (e.g., Clark 1998; Marginson and Considine 2000; 
Bok 2003; Khurana 2007; Donoghue 2008). A number of processes have been identified as 
drivers behind this development (e.g. Bleiklie and Kogan 2007; Schimank 2005).  
First, the rise of mass education during the 1980s and 1990s made higher education 
more expensive and visible to the public. This fact contributed to pressure for efficiency and 
accountability towards the tax-payer.1 Second, it has been criticized that the traditional system 
of self-governance in universities has impeded the necessary reforms towards mass education. 
New public management was seen as a way of breaking the “reform blockade”. Third, a 
growing demand for relevance of research became influential in the public debate. In their 
                                                
1 For an overview of the transition to mass higher education in various countries see Teichler (1988). 
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book “The New Production of Science” Gibbons et al. (1994) claimed that science has been 
transformed from a traditional university- and discipline-centered “Mode 1” knowledge 
production to a so called transdisciplinary “Mode 2” knowledge production in which 
stakeholders from outside the university are involved.2 Therefore criteria of quality are no 
longer determined by academic peers only. Research comes under pressure to legitimate its 
outcomes to people outside academia. Fourth, “economics has won the battle for theoretical 
hegemony in academia and society as a whole“ (Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton 2005, p. 10). As 
a consequence, standard economics, in particular the principal agent view, has gained 
dominance not only in corporate governance (Daily et al. 2003) but also in public and 
academic governance. According to standard economics, scholars have to be monitored and 
sanctioned in the same way as other employees. The underlying assumption is that control 
and correctly administered pay-for-performance schemes positively impact motivation and 
lead to an efficient allocation of resources (Propper 2006). Taken together, the ideals about 
the governance of universities have changed from a “republic of scholars” to a “stakeholder 
organization” in which the voice of scholars is but one among several stakeholders and 
professorial autonomy is curtailed (Speckbacher et al. 2008). 
This view stands at first glance in stark contrast to the ideal of self-governance of the 
scientific community.3 This ideal was undisputed for a long time. Over three hundred years 
ago, Gottfried Leibniz promoted the “republic of letters” – an independent, self-defining 
network of scholars that transcends national and religious boundaries (Leibniz 1931).4 Polanyi 
(1962/2002, p. 479) contends “The soil of academic science must be exterritorial in order to 
secure its rule by scientific opinion.” His “republic of science” is based on the self-co-
ordination of independent scientists. Authority “is established between scientists, not above 
them.” (p. 471). Authors like Bush (1945), Merton (1973), and Stokes (1997) warn that 
outside actors are tempted to shape science according to their own value systems and thus 
jeopardize the mission of science. This view is supported by the economics of science (Arrow 
1962; Nelson 1959, 2004; Dasgupta and David 1994; Stephan 1996). According to this view, 
in academia the evaluation by peers has to substitute for the evaluation by the market because 
of two fundamental characteristics of science, its public nature and its high uncertainty. The 
public nature of scientific discoveries which leads to a market failure has been intensively 
discussed by Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959, 2006). The fundamental uncertainty of 
                                                
2 For a criticism of this approach see Weingart (1997). 
3 As Lawrence (2003, p. 259) puts it “Managers are stealing power from scientists”. 
4 For a discussion see Ultee (1987). 
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scientific endeavors also leads to a market failure. It exists because success in academia is 
reflected by success in the market often only after a long delay or sometimes not at all (Bush 
1945; Nelson 1959, 2004, 2006). In addition, research often produces serendipity effects; that 
is, it provides answers to unasked questions (Stephan 1996; Simonton 2004). As it is often not 
predictable which usefulness a particular research endeavor produces and whether it ever will 
be marketable, peers instead of the market have to evaluate whether a piece of research 
represents an advance. Peers have the opportunity to identify possible errors and risks; they 
can profit themselves from the innovation to push forward their own research; redundancies 
are avoided; and the new knowledge can quickly be used for new and cheaper technologies. 
Due to failure of markets and prices there is a special “currency” that governs the republic of 
science, the priority rule (Merton 1957; Dasgupta and David 1994; Stephan 1996; Gittelman 
and Kogut 2003). This rule attributes success to the person who first makes an invention, and 
who the scientific community recognizes to be first. The priority rule serves two purposes, 
hastening discoveries, and hastening their disclosure (Dasgupta and David 1994, p. 499): A 
discovery must be communicated as quickly as possible to the community of peers in order to 
gain their recognition. 
Consequently, the peer review system is taken to be the founding stone of academic 
research evaluation. Indicators are awards, honorary doctorates, or membership in prestigious 
academies (Stephan 1996; Frey and Neckermann 2008).5 Its main form for the majority of 
scholars consists of publications and citations in professional journals with high impact 
factors. Such indicators are provided by academic rankings, based on peer-reviewed 
publications, citations, and the impact factors of journals like Thomson Reuters’s Impact 
Factor (JIF) (see Garfield 2006, for a historical review) and the relatively recent h-index 
(Hirsch 2005).6 
In that view, a well-designed governance system based on academic rankings seems to 
combine perfectly an output-oriented evaluation of researchers, as postulated by new public 
management, with the requirements of a peer-based evaluation system, as postulated by the 
economics of science. It is based on the one side on evaluations of the peers who are able to 
assess the quality of research from inside the scientific world. On the other side it seems to be 
an easy to understand measure for non-experts like politicians, administrators and other 
                                                
5 Zuckerman (1992) estimates that by the beginning of the 1990s around 3,000 different scientific awards existed 
in North America. 
6 Examples of prominent rankings are ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Report (The Thomson 
Corporation 2008b); ISI Web of Knowledge Essential Science Indicators (The Thomson Corporation 2008a); 
IDEAS Ranking (IDEAS and RePEc 2008); Academic Ranking of World Universities (Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University 2007); or Handelsblatt Ranking (Handelsblatt 2010). 
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stakeholders to evaluate the quality of research from outside. Therefore, today these measures 
are adopted almost universally in academia for most things that matter as part of the present 
research governance system: tenure, salary, grants, and budget decisions. This has lead to an 
ever growing evaluation industry and actively marketed tools like the ISI Web of Science. 
Empirically Based Findings on Academic Rankings 
Academic rankings have become prominent because of two reasons. First, they are intended 
to give the public an overview over the success of research activities. Second, they avoid 
some problems of qualitative peer reviews which have been discussed recently (e.g., 
Armstrong, 1997; Wenneras and Wold 1999; Brook 2003; Frey 2003; Bedeian 2004; 
Starbuck 2005, 2006; Tsang and Frey 2007; Gillies 2005, 2008; Abramo et al. 2009):7 
• Low inter-rater reliability. There is an extensive literature on the low extent to which 
reviewing reports conform to each other (Miner and MacDonald 1981; Cole 1992; Weller 
2001). The correlation between the judgments of two peers falls between 0.09 and 0.5 
(Starbuck 2005). A much discussed study of peer reviewing was conducted by Peters and 
Ceci (1982). They resubmitted 12 articles to the top-tier journals that had published them 
only 18 to 32 months earlier, giving the articles fictitious authors at obscure institutions. 
Only three out of 38 editors and reviewers recognized that the articles had already been 
published. From the remaining nine articles, eight were rejected. It is important that the 
correlation is higher for papers rejected than for papers accepted (Cichetti 1991). This 
means that peer reviewers are better able to identify academic low performers; that is, it 
is easier to identify papers that do not meet minimum quality standards than those that are 
a result of excellent research (Lindsey 1991; Moed 2007). 
• Low prognostic quality. The reviewers’ rating of manuscripts quality is found to correlate 
only 0.24 with later citations (Gottfredson 1978). According to Starbuck (2006, pp. 83–
84), the correlation of a particular reviewer’s evaluation with the actual quality as 
measured by later citations of the manuscript reviewed is between 0.25 and 0.3. This 
correlation rarely rises above 0.37, although there is evidence that higher prestige 
journals publish more high-value articles (Judge, Cable, Colbert, and Rynes 2007). 
                                                
7 See also the special issue of Science and Public Policy (2007) and the Special Theme Section on “The use and 
misuse of bibliometric indices in evaluating scholarly performance” of Ethics in Science and Environmental 
Politics, 8 June 2008. 
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Because of some randomness in editorial selections (Starbuck 2005),8 one editor even 
advises rejected authors to “Just Try, Try Again” (Durso 1997).9 
• Low consistency over time. Many rejections of papers in highly ranked journals are 
documented that later were awarded high prizes, including the Nobel Prize (Gans and 
Shepherd 1994; Campanario 1996; Horrobin 1996; Lawrence 2003). This means that in 
the case of radical innovations or paradigm shifts (Kuhn 1962) peer reviews often fail.  
• Confirmation biases. Reviewers find methodological shortcomings in 71 percent of 
papers contradicting the mainstream, compared to only 25 percent of papers supporting 
the mainstream (Mahoney 1977). 
 
As a reaction to the criticism of qualitative peer reviewing, bibliometric methods, that 
is, rankings based on the number of publications, citations, and impact factors have become 
more prominent.10 Though rankings are based on qualitative peer reviews it is expected that 
some of the problems discussed are counterbalanced by the following advantages of rankings 
(e.g., Abramo et al. 2009). 
• Rankings are more objective because they are based on more than the three or four 
evaluations typical for qualitative approaches. Through statistical aggregation individual 
reviewers´ biases may be balanced out (Weingart 2005). 
• The influence of the old boys’ network may be avoided. An instrument is provided to 
dismantle unfounded claims to fame. Rankings can serve as fruitful, exogenous shocks to 
some schools and make them care more about the reactions of the public (Khurana 2007, 
p. 337). 
• Rankings are cheaper than pure qualitative reviews, at least in terms of time. They admit 
updates and rapid intertemporal comparisons. 
 
However, in recent times it became clear that bibliometric measures may 
counterbalance some problems of qualitative peer reviews, but that they have disadvantages 
of their own (Butler 2007; Donovan 2007; Weingart 2005; Adler et al. 2008; Adler and 
                                                
8 See also the “Social Text”-Affair, which deals with the malfunction of editors: The physicist Alain D. Sokal 
published an article in a (non refereed) special issue of the journal “Social Text” which was written as a parody. 
The editors did not realize the bogus article as a hoax, see Sokal (1996).  
9 However, this strategy overburdens reviewers and may lower the quality of reviews. For example, they have 
neither enough time nor the incentive to check the quality of the data and of the statistical methods employed, as 
some striking examples in economics demonstrate (Hamermesh 2007). 
10 For example the British Government decided to replace its Research Assessment Exercise based mainly on 
qualitative evaluations with a system based mainly on bibliometrics. Interestingly, the Australian Government, 
which has used mostly bibliometrics in the past, plans in the future to strengthen qualitative peer review methods 
(Donovan 2007). 
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Harzing 2009). Until now, mainly technical and methodological problems were highlighted 
(van Raan 2005). 
Technical problems consist of errors in the citing-cited matching process, leading to a 
loss of citations to a specific publication. First, it is estimated that this loss amounts on 
average to 7 percent of the citations. In specific situations, this percentage may even be as 
high as 30 percent (Moed 2002). Second, there are many errors made in attributing 
publications and citations to the source, for example, institutes, departments, or universities. 
In the popular ranking of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University, these errors led to differences of 
possibly 5 to 10 positions in the European list and about 25 to 50 positions in the world list 
(Moed 2002). The impact factor of Thomson´s ISI Web of Science, is accused of having 
many faults (Monastersky 2005; Taylor, Perakakis, and Trachana 2008). It is unlikely that the 
errors are distributed equally. Kotiaho, Tomkin, and Simmons (1999) find that names from 
unfamiliar languages lead to a geographical bias against non-English speaking countries. 
Third, it has been shown that small changes in measurement techniques and classifications 
can have large effects on the position in rankings (Ursprung and Zimmer 2006; Frey and Rost 
forthcoming). 
Methodological problems of constructing meaningful and consistent indices to 
measure scientific output have been widely discussed recently (Lawrence 2002, 2003; Frey 
2003, 2009; Adler et al. 2008; Adler and Harzing 2009). Therefore, we briefly mention the 
main problems discussed in the literature. 
First, there are selection problems. Often only journal articles are selected for 
incorporation in the rankings, although books, proceedings, or blogs contribute considerably 
to scholarly work. Other difficulties include the low representation of small research fields, 
non-English papers, regional journals, and journals from other disciplines even if they are 
highly ranked in their respective disciplines. Hence, collaboration across disciplinary 
boundaries is not furthered. 
Second, citations can have a supportive or rejective meaning or merely a herding 
effect. The probability of being cited is a function of previous citations according to the 
“Matthew effect” in science (Merton 1968). Simkin and Roychowdhury (2005) estimate that, 
according to an analysis of misprints turning up repeatedly in citations, about 70–90 percent 
of scientific citations are copied from the list of references used in other papers; that is, 70–90 
percent of the papers cited have not been read. Consequently, incorrect citations are endemic. 
They are promoted by the increasing use of meta-analyses, which generally do not distinguish 
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between high and low quality analyses (Todd and Ladle 2008). In addition, citations may 
reflect fleeting references to fashionable “hot topics.” 
Third, using the impact factor of a journal as a proxy for the quality of a single article 
leads to substantial misclassification. It has been found that many top articles are published in 
non-top journals, and many articles in top journals generate very few citations in management 
research (Starbuck 2005; Singh, Haddad, and Chow 2007), economics (Laband and Tollison 
2003; Oswald 2007), and science (Campbell 2008). A study of the “International 
Mathematical Union” even concludes that the use of impact factors can be “breathtakingly 
naïve” (Adler et al. 2008, p.14) because it leads to large error probabilities. 
Fourth, there are difficulties comparing citations and impact factors between 
disciplines and even between subdisciplines (Bornman et al. 2008). 
Implications Discussed to Overcome the Problems of Rankings  
In recent times some suggestions have been made to deal with the technical and 
methodological problems of rankings. 
First, a temporary moratorium of rankings is suggested “until more valid and reliable 
ways to assess scholarly contributions can be developed” (Adler and Harzing 2009, p. 72). As 
is the case for most authors, they believe that the identification of particular shortcomings 
should serve as a stepping stone to develop a more reliable research evaluation system (see 
also Abramo et al. 2009; Starbuck 2009). In contrast, policy-makers admit that indicators like 
rankings and grants are spurious. But as long as scholars present no better data, they will use 
it since they believe that the present data are better than none (e.g. Schimank 2005). 
Second, it has been argued that bibliometric indicators should not be used as ready-to-
go indicators lacking the competence to understand what is being measured (van Raan 2005; 
Weingart 2005). Therefore, standards of good practice for the analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation of bibliometric data should be developed and adhered to when assessing research 
performance. This needs a lot of expertise (Bornmann et al. 2008), which constrains 
considerably the responsible use of rankings as a handy instrument for politicians, 
administrators, and journalists to assess academic performance by rankings. 
Third, it is suggested to use a number of rankings (e.g. Adler and Harzing 2009), since 
their results differ markedly, in particular with respect to rankings of individuals (Frey and 
Rost forthcoming). Again, this suggestion constrains rankings as easy to handle instruments 
for non-experts. 
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Fourth, a combination of qualitative peer reviews and bibliometrics, so-called 
informed peer reviews, could be applied. It is argued that they can balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of these two methods (Weingart 2005; Butler 2007; Moed 2007). 
Fifth, a holistic approach of evaluation has been suggested, which combines measures 
of research quality and impact with peer and user evaluation, taking into account the views of 
various stakeholders inside and outside academia (Donovan 2007). However this approach 
bears the danger of compromising on the smallest common denominator and of inhibiting 
research with unorthodox or uncertain outcomes. 
These suggestions may to some extent mitigate the problems of rankings, but they 
make the use of rankings difficult for non-experts and thus are not able to reconcile the aims 
of “new public management” with the “republic of science” as intended. Moreover, even if 
rankings worked perfectly, they cannot overcome the problems of behavioral reactions to 
rankings (Osterloh and Frey 2009). 
Behavioral Reactions to Rankings 
Even if over time the methodological and technical problems could be coped with, severe 
problems remain, caused by unintended side effects of rankings on the side of individuals and 
institutions. First they consist in the so-called reactive measures (Campbell 1957), caused by 
the fact that people change their behavior strategically in reaction to being observed or 
measured, in particular if the measurement is not accepted voluntarily (Espeland and Sauder 
2007). Reactivity threatens the validity of measures according to the saying “When a measure 
becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure” (Strathern 1996, p 4). Second the 
unintended consequences consist in the danger of reducing the intrinsically motivated 
curiosity of researchers. Both problems, which are discussed only by few authors in the 
research governance literature, have consequences on the level of individual scholars and on 
the level of institutions. 
 
Level of individual scholars 
Reactivity on the level of individual scholars may take on the one hand the form of goal 
displacement and on the other hand the form of counterstrategies to “beat the system.” 
 Goal displacement (Perrin 1998) means that people maximize indicators that are easy 
to measure and disregard features that are hard to measure. This problem is also discussed as 
the multiple-tasking effect (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Ethiraj and Levinthal 2009). 
There is much evidence of this effect in laboratory experiments (Staw and Boettger 1990; 
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Gilliland and Landis 1992; Schweitzer, Ordonez, and Douma 2004; Ordonez, Schweitzer, 
Galinsky, and Bazerman 2009)11. For example, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) show that output-
dependent financial incentives lead to the neglect of non-contractible tasks. 
In academia examples can be found e.g. in the “slicing strategy” whereby scholars 
divide their research results to a “least publishable unit” (Weingart 2005, p. 125) by breaking 
them into as many papers as possible to increase their publication list. Another example of 
goal displacement is the lowering of standards for PhD candidates when the amount of 
completed PhDs is used as a measure in rankings. Empirical field evidence of goal 
displacement in academia is shown in an Australian study (Butler 2003). The mid-1990s saw 
a linking of the number of peer-reviewed publications to the funding of universities and 
individual scholars. The number of publications increased dramatically, but the quality as 
measured by relative citation rates decreased.12 
Counterstrategies are more difficult to observe than goal displacement. They consist of 
altering research behavior itself in order to “beat the system” (Moed 2007). Numerous 
examples can be found in educational evaluation (e.g., Haney 2002; Nichols, Glass, and 
Berliner 2006; Heilig and Darling-Hammond 2008). The following behaviors are of special 
relevance in academia. 
Scholars distort their results to please, or at least not to oppose, prospective referees. 
Bedeian (2003) finds evidence that no less than 25 percent of authors revised their 
manuscripts according to the suggestions of the referee although they knew that the change 
was incorrect. Frey (2003) calls this behavior “academic prostitution” 
Authors cite possible reviewers because the latter are prone to judge papers more 
favorably that approvingly cite their work, and these same reviewers tend to reject papers that 
threaten their previous work (Lawrence 2003, p. 260).13 Authors willingly adapt to editors 
who pressure them to cite their respective journals in order to raise their impact rankings 
(Garfield 1997; Smith 1997; Monastersky 2005) 
To meet the expectations of their peers—many of whom consist of mainstream 
scholars—authors may be discouraged from conducting and submitting creative and 
                                                
11 Locke and Latham (2009) in a rejoinder provide counterevidence to Ordonez et al. (2009). They argue that 
goal setting has no negative effects. However, they disregard that goal setting may well work for simple but not 
for complex tasks within an organization. For the latter case, see Earley, Connolly, and Ekegren (1989) and 
Ethiraj and Levinthal (2009). 
12 It could be argued that a remedy to this problem consists of resorting to citation counts. While this remedy 
overcomes some of the shortcomings of publication counts, it is subject to the technical and methodological 
problems mentioned. 
13 Such problems of sabotage in tournaments have been extensively discussed in personnel economics, see 
Lazear and Shaw (2007). 
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unorthodox research (Horrobin 1996; Prichard and Willmott 1997; Armstrong 1997; Gillies 
2008). 
The effects of reactivity are enforced if the second kind of unintended consequences 
takes place, the decrease of intrinsically motivated curiosity which generally is acknowledged 
to be of decisive importance in academic research (Amabile 1996, 1998; Stephan 1996; 
Simonton 2004). There exists considerable empirical evidence in psychology and 
psychological economics14 that there is a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation by 
externally imposed goals linked to incentives which do not give a supportive feedback and are 
perceived to be controlling15 (Frey 1992, 1997; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Gagné and 
Deci 2005; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Ordonez et al. 2009).16  
From that point of view rankings tend to crowd out intrinsically motivated curiosity. 
First, in contrast to qualitative peer reviews rankings do not give a supportive feedback since 
they do not tell scholars how to improve their research. Second, since rankings are mostly 
imposed from outside the content of research is in danger of losing importance. It is 
substituted by the position in the rankings (Kruglansky 1975). As a consequence, the 
dysfunctional reactions of scholars like goal displacement and counterstrategies are enforced 
because they are not constrained by intrinsic preferences. The inducement to “game the 
system” in an instrumental way may get the upper hand. 
 
Level of institutions 
Reactivity on the institutional level takes several forms. First, if rankings are used as measure 
to allocate resources and positions they create a lock-in effect. Even those scholars and 
academic institutions that are aware of the deficiencies of rankings do well not to oppose 
them. If they did so, they would not only be accused of being afraid of competition, but also 
of not contributing to the prestige and resources of their department or university. Therefore, 
it is a better strategy to follow the rules and to play the game. For example, in several 
countries, highly cited scientists are hired immediately before the evaluation of departments 
and programs are scheduled to take place in order to raise publication and citation records. 
                                                
14 We prefer the expression “psychological economics” rather than the more common expression “behavioral 
economics” for two reasons. First, economists had already examined human behavior before this new field 
emerged. Second, Simon (1985) points out that the term „behavioral” is misleading since it may be confounded 
with the „behaviorist” approach in psychology. 
15 A third precondition is social relatedness, see Gagne and Deci (2005). 
16 The crowding-out effect sometimes is contested e.g. Eisenberger and Cameron (1996); Gerhart and Rynes 
(2003); Locke and Latham (2009). However the empirical evidence for complex tasks and actors intrinsically 
motivated in the first place is strong, see Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999); Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh (2009), 
for a survey of the empirical evidence, see Frey and Jegen (2001). 
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Such stars are highly paid although they often have little involvement with the respective 
university (Brook 2003; Stephan 2008) 
Second, a negative walling-off effect sets in. Scholars themselves are inclined to apply 
rankings to evaluate candidates in order to gain more resources for their research group or 
department. In addition, it is easier to count the publications and citations of colleagues than 
to evaluate the content of their scholarly contributions. By doing this, scholars delegate their 
own judgment to the counting exercise behind rankings, although, by using such metrics, they 
admit their incompetence in that subject (Browman and Stergiou 2008). This practice is 
defended by arguing that specialization in science has increased so much that even within 
disciplines it is impossible to evaluate the research in neighboring fields (Swanson 2004; van 
Fleet, McWilliams, and Siegel 2000). However, this practice in turn reinforces specialization 
and furthers a walling-off effect between disciplines and subdisciplines. By using output 
indicators instead of communicating on the contents, the knowledge in the various fields 
becomes increasingly disconnected. This hampers the ability to create radical innovations that 
often cross disciplinary borders (Amabile et al. 1996; Dogan 1999). 
Third, research is increasingly homogenized. Research endeavors tend to lose the 
diversity that is necessary for a creative research environment. This consequence was pointed 
out for business schools by Gioia and Corley (2002). For economics, Great Britain provides 
an example: the share of heterodox, not strictly neoclassical economics sank drastically since 
the ranking of departments became based mainly on citation counts. Heterodox journals have 
become less attractive for researchers due to their smaller impact factor when compared to 
mainstream journals (Lee 2007; see also Holcombe 2004) 
Fourth, the establishment of new research areas is inhibited. In Great Britain, the 
Research Assessment Exercise has discouraged research with uncertain outcomes and has 
encouraged projects with quick payoffs (Hargreaves Heap 2002). 
Fifth, it is argued that a positional competition or a rent-seeking game takes place 
instead of an enhancement of research quality by the increased investment by universities and 
journals in evaluating research (Ehrenberg 2000). It has been shown that the percentage of 
“dry holes” (i.e., articles in refereed journal which have never been cited) in economic 
research during 1974 to 1996 has remained constant (Laband and Tollison 2003), though the 
resources to improve the screening of papers have risen substantially.  
With respect to motivational aspects of rankings on the institutional level a negative 
selection effect is to be expected, in particular, when monetary rewards are linked to the 
position in rankings. According to Merton (1973), a special incentive system called “taste for 
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science” exists in academia. It is characterized by a relatively low importance of monetary 
incentives and a high importance of peer recognition and autonomy. People are attracted to 
research for which, at the margin, the autonomy to satisfy their curiosity and to gain peer 
recognition is more important than money. They value the possibility of following their own 
scientific goals more than financial rewards. These scholars are prepared to trade-off 
autonomy against money, as empirically documented by Stern (2004): scientists pay to be 
scientists. The preference for autonomy to choose their own goals is important for innovative 
research in two ways. It leads to a useful self-selection effect, and autonomy is the most 
important precondition for intrinsic motivation, which in turn is required for creative research 
(Amabile et al. 1996; Amabile 1998; Mudambi, R., Mudambi, S., and Navarra 2007) 
Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings? 
As discussed, academic rankings have advantages and disadvantages. So far, it cannot be 
decided whether the advantages of rankings outweigh the disadvantages. The intended 
advantages consist of more transparency and control of research by non-experts as it is 
expressed by the view of new public management. The disadvantages consist on the one hand 
in the technical and methodological problems which might be overcome sometime in the 
future. On the other hand they consist in the behavioral reactions of reactivity and motivation 
disturbances which remain even if the indicators were perfect. As a consequence, there is the 
danger that “the very action of controlling universities and making them more accountable 
leads them to give a less good account” (Hargreaves Heap 2002, p. 388). The question arises 
whether there is a third way for research governance which makes use of peer reviews and 
rankings to a certain degree, but limits its importance for academic careers. 
To answer this question we refer to insights from managerial control theory (e.g. 
Thompson 1967; Ouchi 1977, 1979; Eisenhardt 1985, Schreyögg and Steinmann 1987; 
Simons 1995). According to this approach there exist three types of control systems: output 
control, process control, and clan control. The type of control applied must fit the knowledge 
available to the controller (Turner and Makhija 2006) with respect to outcome measurability  
and process relations. 
Output control is useful if well-defined unambiguous indicators are available to the 
evaluator, while knowledge of cause-effect or process relations is not necessary. Therefore 
output controls are attractive to non-experts. As we have discussed, rankings are far from 
delivering unambiguous indicators to non-experts and should therefore be used with utmost 
care. Process control is useful when outputs are not easy to measure and to attribute, but 
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when the controller is knowledgeable on process relations whose correctness is to be 
evaluated ex post. Therefore process control is applicable only for peers who are familiar with 
the state of the art about processes and methodologies in the respective research field. As 
discussed, peer control has many shortcomings and is particularly questionable when 
unorthodox contributions have to be evaluated. In such cases well established standards of 
methods often are challenged. If neither output control nor process control work sufficiently 
then clan control has to be applied (Ouchi 1977, 1979). Clan control is defined as a form of 
input or ex ante control, based on careful selection and socialization. The aim is to make 
candidates members of a community in which aligned norms and values are internalized and 
are part of their intrinsic motivation. If input control is successful, mutual tolerance for 
ambiguity is possible, which is important when output measurement is questionable and 
procedural rules are in flux. 
What does clan control mean in the case of research governance? Aspiring scholars 
should be carefully socialized and selected by peers to show that they master the state of the 
art, have preferences according to the “taste for science” (Merton 1973), and are able to direct 
themselves. Those passing a rigorous input control should be given much autonomy to foster 
their creativity and intrinsic motivated curiosity. This includes the provision of basic funds to 
give a certain degree of independence after having passed the entrance barriers (Gillies 2008; 
Horrobin 1996). 
Clan control still requires to some extent peer evaluations. However, this applies 
during restricted periods, namely during the selection and socialization process and when 
scholars apply to a new position or for a grant, or submit a paper to a journal. However, there 
is a great difference between being under pressure to publish permanently one the one hand, 
and being submitted to control during a restricted phase on the other hand, knowing that once 
this phase is over one will enjoy a wide range of autonomy. Moreover, clan control is better 
able than output control to use different indicators in an informed way taking their 
weaknesses into account. 
Input or clan control was recommended by the famous President of Harvard 
University James Bryan Conant: „There is only one proved method of assisting the 
advancement of pure science – that is picking men of genius, backing them heavily, and 
leaving them to direct themselves“ (Renn 2002).17 This view is still part of the „Principles 
Governing Research at Harvard”, stating: „The primary means for controlling the quality of 
                                                
17 Letter to the New York Times, 13. August 1945. 
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scholarly activities of this Faculty is through the rigorous academic standards applied in 
selecting its members.“18 
Such governance principles are also employed in other professions characterized by a 
low degree of observable outputs, such as in the life-tenured American judiciary (e.g. Benz 
and Frey 2007; Posner forthcoming). These ideas are in accordance with empirical findings in 
psychological economics. They show that on average intrinsically motivated people do not 
shirk when they are given autonomy (Frey 1992; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Fong and Tosi 
2007). Instead, they raise their efforts when they perceive that they are trusted (Falk and 
Kosfeld 2006; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Frost, Osterloh, and Weibel forthcoming). 
A comparison between two Australian Universities with similar research interests 
illustrates the usefulness of clan control (Butler 2003). In the late 1980 the University of 
Western Australia distributed research funds according to publication counts as the main 
criterion. The University of Queensland followed a different strategy, recruiting bright young 
researchers and providing them with a strong resource base. Both universities succeeded in 
lifting their publications per researcher. But only the University of Queensland was successful 
in improving the quality of publications whereas the University of Western Australia fell 
below the average Australian score.  
Clan control has advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages consist first in the 
danger that some scholars that have passed the selection might misuse their autonomy, reduce 
their work effort and waste their funds. But this is the price that has to be paid for the 
potential high performers to flourish. It will be the lower the more rigorous the selection 
process is conducted. As a consequence, recruiting is by far the most important issue for 
academic self-governance. Second, clan control is in danger of being submitted to groupthink 
(Janis 1972). This danger can be overcome by fostering diversity of scholarly approaches 
within the relevant peer group. The advantages consist in downplaying the unfortunate 
consequences of rankings while inducing young scholars to learn the professional standards of 
their discipline under the supporting assistance of peers. This support allows to balance the 
internal tension of scientific work between conformity and originality. “The professional 
standards of science must impose a framework of discipline and at the same time encourage 
rebellion against it” (Polanyi 1962/2002, p. 470). Another advantage might consist in the fact 
that the provision of basic funds to those that have passed the entrance barriers might increase 
diversity of research approaches (Gillies 2008) and helps to avoid inefficient “research 
empires” subject to a decreasing marginal effect of additional research resources (Horrobin 
                                                
18 See http://www.fas.harvard.edu/research/greybook/principles.html. 
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1996; Viner, Powell, and Green 2004). While there exists some empirical work in this regard 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000; Jansen et al. 2007), this issue needs further research. 
Conclusion 
This paper argues that academic rankings have major disadvantages which tend to be 
disregarded or downplayed both in the literature and in practice. Rigorous selection and 
socialization should play a major role in research governance. In contrast, rankings should be 
attributed lesser importance. This does not mean a return to the old system of “academic 
oligarchy”. Rather, a new balance is sought between “public management” and the “republic 
of science”. This change in academic governance cannot be started and achieved by 
individual scholars because of the lock-in effect but needs more far-reaching institutional 
changes. In particular, the bodies overseeing the research system need to take the 
shortcomings of solely or mainly relying on rankings into account and pay more emphasis on 
the selection and socialization process that provides the basis of academic excellence. 
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